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JUDICIAL REVIEW-SCOPE

Reviewability of Matters Committed to Agency Discretion
In Hahn v. GottliebI the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that the approval of rent increases by the Federal Housing
Administration for apartments constructed pursuant to the National
Housing Act 2 was agency action "committed to agency discretion by
law" 3 and therefore not subject to judicial review. Tenants of a lowincome housing project subsidized under the National Housing Act
sought a hearing to protest their landlord's rent increase application
to the Regional Director of the FHA. After the FHA denied their
request,. the tenants brought suit in federal district court for a
preliminary injunction which was first granted but later vacated when
the FHA agreed to provide a hearing. The tenants, at an informal
hearing before FHA staff, presented evidence that the requested rent
increases were attributable to construction defects rather than
increased operating costs and were not fully necessary to maintain a
fair return on investment. The Regional Director, however, granted
an increase.' The tenants immediately renewed their request for a
preliminary injunction to require that the agency afford them a "full
and fair" hearing. The district court, recognizing the agency's broad
discretion, refused to grant the requested injunction, 5 and the tenants
appealed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court.
The federal common law of reviewability of agency action has
undergone a transition from early cases in which the courts uniformly
refused review to a more moderate standard with a presumption of
reviewability.1 In the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding7 the Supreme
Court refused to review a decision by the Secretary of the Navy,
stating that "[tihe interference of the courts with the performance of
the ordinary duties of the executive departments of government would
be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that
1. 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
2. 12U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3)(1964).
3. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1970): "This
chapter applies . . . except to the extent that . . . (2) agency action is committed to agency

discretion by law."
4. Out of a requested $28 monthly increase, an $11 immediate increase and an additional
$I I increase effective after one year were granted. 450 F.2d at 1245.
5. See 430 F.2d at 1245. The lower court opinion is unreported.
6. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.04-.07 (1958).
7. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
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such a power was never intended to be given to them." 8 In a later case,
Keim v. United StatesI the Supreme Court stated:
These matters are peculiarly within the province of those who are in charge
of and superintending the departments, and, until Congress by some special
and direct legislation makes provision to the contrary, we are clear that they
must be settled by those administrative officers.'"

Although some later cases followed the early rigid standard," a more
flexible approach developed during the twentieth century. The
Supreme Court's first recognition of the right to judicial review of an
adverse agency decision came in American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty.' 2 In that case, the Postmaster General had
determined that the petitioner's business was fraudulent and denied
him the use of the mails. While recognizing the general nonreviewability of findings of fact, the Court held that an aggrieved
party has the right to invoke judicial review as a matter of law where it
can be shown that the agency has acted in excess of its statutory
authority.13 In subsequent cases involving the ICC, 4 the Federal
Reserve Board,"5 and the Department of Agriculture," the Supreme
Court has held in favor of reviewability in the absence of an adequate
rebuttal of the presumption. 7 Thus, even before the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act, federal common law had been steadily
developing a doctrine of reviewability.
Under the APA, with its proviso of nonreviewability of action
committed by law to agency discretion,' a difficult problem arises
when a court is forced to decide whether to follow the judicial
presumption and grant review of an agency decision or to decline
review on the ground that the questions involved are more properly
"committed to agency discretion by law." The Supreme Court,
addressing itself to the problem in the recent case of Abbott
"8.Id. at 516.

9. 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
10. Id. at 296.
Ii. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1943); Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
12. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
13. Id. at 108.
14. Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Dismuke v. United States, 297
U.S. 167 (1936).
15. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
16. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
17. See4 K. DAvIs, supra note 6, § 28.07, at 31.
18. U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
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Laboratoriesv. Gardner,9 has emphasized a strong presumption of

judicial review and called for rigid scrutinizing of congressional
purpose before a court declines review. Citing a previous case,2° the

Court stated that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access
to judicial review."' 2' The Court in Barlow v. Collins2 added further
clarity to the area by declining to find that statutory language phrased

in permissible terms was clear and convincing evidence of
congressional intent to limit review2 and instead inferred a right of
judicial review in plaintiffs who are members of a class whose interests

Congress intended to protect. 2 Other 1970 cases, although finding a
broad discretion in the agency involved, have refused to hold agency

acts unreviewable if certain conditions are present. Thus, a denial by
the SEC of the proxy solicitation rights of a dissident shareholder

group was reviewed because it resulted from a misinterpretation of the
federal proxy rules by the Commission.2 And the awarding of a
contract to an ineligible bidder by the FAA 21 as well as the awarding

of a grant under the Model Cities program by HUD21 to a recipient
who failed to participate in the planning of the project were reviewed

since the actions violated applicable statutory requirements. Decisions
made by the Department of Agriculture in removing a product from
the market with insufficient evidence as to its harmful effects,2 and

NLRB action in refusing to bring a complaint against an employer
when it had not even considered the complainant's application2 were
19. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
20. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962).
21. 387 U.S. at 141.
22. 397 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1970).
23. The words "prescribe such regulations as he may deem proper to carry out the
provisions-of this chapter" did not preclude review of a regulatory change by the Secretary of
Agriculture that substantially affected the rights of tenant farmers. Id. at 164-65. For other
recent examples of judicial review of the Department of Agriculture's discretion, see Nor-Am
Agricultural Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133, rev'd on rehearing, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th
Cir. 1970); Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir.), modifying 427
F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also JUDICIAL REVIaw-ACTiONs REVIEWABLE section supra.
24. 397 U.S. at 167. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
25. Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d'659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also STANDING TO
SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW section supra.
27. North City Area Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3rd. Cir. 1970).
28. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970).
29. See Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Ordman, 27 AD. L.2D 608 (C.D. Calif.
1970).
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held to merit review as arbitrary and capricious exercises of
discretion. Even in denying review of a determination by the
Department of Agriculture"0 to apply portions of the Wholesome
Meat Act 3 1 to North Dakota and of a decision by the Justice
3
Department as to which prison a federal convict should be assigned,
the courts, in addition to finding an intent by Congress to confer
broad discretion on the agency, found that the relevant agency action
was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.? In the
absence of specific guidelines, the recent cases, ascertaining whether
Congress intended for the particular agency action to be unreviewable
because committed to agency discretion, have examined the intent of
Congress to benefit the class to which the plaintiffs belong and in
addition have considered whether the agency action was arbitrary and
capricious or extra-legal in nature.
In Hahn v. Gottlieb, the First Circuit readily acknowledged the
existence of a "strong presumption in favor of review which . . .
[would be] overcome only by 'clear and convincing evidence' that
Congress intended to cut off review above the agency level."34 Noting
at the outset that the National Housing Act is silent regarding judicial
review, the court addressed itself to the issue of whether the instant
action would be non-reviewable because of a congressional intent to
commit the action to agency discretion by law. Rather than attempt
to ascertain Congress' intent by looking only to statutory language or
legislative history, as do many of the recent cases, the First Circuit
labeled three factors as determinative: first, are the issues presented
appropriate for judicial review?; second, would the plaintiff's interests
be irreparably harmed in the absence of review?; and third, would
review inhibit the agency in carrying out its assigned role?35 In
considering the first factor, the court pointed out that it was illequipped to superintend economic and managerial decisions of the
30. Fargo Packing Corp. v. Hardin, 27 AD. L.2D 488 (D.N.D. 1970).
31. 81 Stat. 584 (1967).

32. See Mercer v. U.S. Medical Center for Fed. Prisoners, 27 AD. L.2D 484 (W.D. Mo.
1970).
33. But see Rasmussen v. United States, 421 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1970). There the Post Office
Department was allowed to discontinue the transportation of mail on certain railroads without
complying with the statutory requirement that the effect of discontinuance on the revenues to

those railroads be considered. The court considered that the statute permitting the Secretary's
action was permissive rather than mandatory, and thus the Postmaster General's action was

committed to agency discretion by law.
34. 430 F.2d at 1249.

35. Id.
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FHA.3 Of the second factor, the threat of harm to the plaintiff's
interests, the court decided that the long-run interests of these
plaintiffs would not be well served by allowing judicial review of rent
increases. While recognizing the weakness of the plaintiff's bargaining
position and their limited choices, the court reasoned that the delays,
hardships, and frictions engendered by the process of litigation would
be contrary to the tenants' interests and would likely frustrate the
legislative program of indirectly providing assistance to the plaintiffs
by stimulating private construction of low-cost housing. Third, in
considering the effect of judicial review on the agency, the court
concluded that judicial scrutiny of FHA rent decisi6ns would lead to a
more formalized decision-making process which, because of the vast
demands for agency time, would have an adverse effect on the
agency's performance. The court also emphasized that allowing the
review herein sought would impose additional restraints37 on landlords
and discourage private investment in low and middle income housing,
thus defeating the statutory purpose. The court concluded "that
Congress did not intend the courts to supervise FHA rent decisions" 3
and that such questions were "matters committed to agency
discretion by law."
The First Circuit's three pronged test of whether an action is nonreviewable because "committed to agency discretion by law" appears
to be a significant development in this area of administrative law.
Courts, in determining which agency decisions should be
unreviewable under the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine,
have had difficulty in discerning from the language of the applicable
statute the amount of discretion granted to the agencies. Rather, they
have tried to discern whether Congress intended that the action of the
particular agency be reviewed. Recognizing this need to discern intent,
the First Circuit, borrowing from a recent commentator,39 initiated a
test that allows greater objectivity in evaluating the intent of Congress
36. Whereas rent decisions would be part of the FHA's normal workload, the court felt that
its own lack of knowledge and experience in determining economic soundness of housing
projects and reasonable returns on such investments would prevent it from effectively reviewing
an FHA decision. Id.; see Saferstein, Nonreviewability:A FunctionalAnalysis of "Committed
to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv.367, 371 (1968).
37. The court cited several restraints on FHA landlords including requirements that
building plans be approved and cost ceilings fixed, that rentals and rates of return pass agency
scrutiny, and that there be no discrimination in the selection of tenants. 430 F.2d at 1250.
38. Id. at 1251.
39. See Saferstein, supra note 36, at 371.
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than had previous case law." This method requires balancing the
competing interests: the need of the court to arrive at a meaningful
decision; the effect judicial review would have on the agency's
functions; and the effect review or abstention would have on the
individual bringing the suit.4 ' In Hahn, the court appears to have
arrived at a suitable balance by the application of its announced test.
As the court notes, the plaintiffs have no recourse other than judicial
challenge to agency action that results in rent increases. They
undoubtedly have a paramount interest in judicial review that should
not be defeated simply because a court is reluctant to review a decision
not within its field of expertise.42 The function of appellate review of
administrative action is to insure that the agency acts within its
statutory framework. Decisions of the FCC, ICC, CAB, and almost
all of the other federal agencies are based upon complicated factors
requiring the exercise of administrative expertise. But these decisions,
equally as complicated as a rent increase, are reviewed to insure that
the findings of the agency are supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, the lack of expertise in the court should not be sufficient reason
in itself to deny review. The court's concern that the burden of review
added to the other restraints already on the landlords might
discourage private investment seems reasonable, although purely
speculative. The court also points out that there would be no
guarantee of lower rentals4 3 and the adverse effects of the frictions of
litigation could serve to deteriorate landlord-tenant relations.
When the intent of Congress-to benefit members of the
plaintiffs' class under the NHA indirectly by providing low and
middle income housing through the stimulation of private
investment-is considered, the result reached under the Hahn test is
reconcilable with Barlow v. Collins.4 4 In the latter case tenant farmers
appealed a decision of the Department of Agriculture which allowed
payments under the upland cotton program to be pledged as rent for
land. The landlord, after getting the pledges, could force the farmers
to obtain all supplies from him at inflated prices since the tenants now
40. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), which stated that only a
"clear and convincing" showing of evidence of intent could limit judicial review but gave little
enlightenment as to how to ascertain such intent of Congress.
41. 430 F.2d at 1249.
42. Id. at 1249: "[w]e note that courts are ill-equipped to superintend economic and
managerial decisions of the kind involved here."
43. A cross-appeal by a landlord might even result in a greater increase in rent. Id. at 1250.
44. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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lacked financial support. The Supreme Court, in granting review of
the agency's action, recognized a congressional intent to allow judicial
review to plaintiffs who are members of a class that is directly
protected by a statute. In Hahn, however, the protection is indirect,
and granting review would have been in derogation of the interests of
those parties through whom Congress intended to provide benefit to
the members of the plaintiffs' class. The First Circuit, since it allows
for an opposite result in the event the agency ignores a plain statutory
duty, exceeds its jurisdiction, or commits a constitutional error," has
instituted a suitable test for examining the interests of all the parties in
discerning the intent of Congress as to the statutory limitations on
judicial review of a particular agency's action under the "committed
to discretion by law" doctrine.
45. 430 F.2d at 1251.

